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Social Position and Distributive Justice: Experimental Evidence
Abstract

Using a simple, double-blind dictator experiment, we examine the extent to which subjects' choices of
distributive shares are influenced by unearned social position. We measure social position by the initial
distributive shares (resources) and the subjects' ability to determine the final distributive shares (power). We
find that subjects' decisions are consistent with Rawls' (1971) hypothesis that individuals expect a greater
share when in a position with more power and initial resources. Finally, we test if subjects' choices under a
laboratory veil of ignorance are consistent with Rawls' concept of distributive justice. "Veiled" individuals
exhibit preferences that are less risk-averse and have greater variance than Rawls hypothesized. [excerpt]
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1. Introduction
In A Theory of Justice (1971) John Rawls states thatmen are born into various social
positions that yield "different expectations of life" but "cannot possibly be justified by an
appeal to the notions ofmerit or desert" (p. 7). Rawls furtherhypothesizes that ifmen could
choose behind a "veil of ignorance" with regard to social position, theywould unanimously
agree to social institutions that allocate social benefits tomaximize the income of the lowest
income group, and theywould reject institutions or principles (such as utilitarianism) that lead
to gains to some members of society if such gains were to come at the expense of the least
advantaged

members.

It is not possible to directly test the Rawlsian hypothesis in the field. However, the
hypothesis has been tested in laboratory economics and political science experiments (e.g.,
Fr?hlich, Oppenheimer, and Eavey 1987; Fr?hlich and Oppenheimer 1990, 1992; Bond and
Park 1991; Lissowski, Tyszka, and Okrasa 1991; Jackson and Hill 1995; de la Cruz-Dona and
Martina 2000; Oleson 2001; Herne and Suojanen 2004). The conclusion to be drawn from these
studies is that subjects' choices do not conform strictlyto theRawlsian principle of distributive
justice but rather to a mixture of Rawlsian and utilitarian principles.
While related to previous studies, in thatwe test if subjects' choices under a laboratory veil
of ignorance are consistent with theRawlsian hypothesis, our experiments extend the analysis
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by determining the extent towhich subjects' expectations of distributive shares are influenced
by unearned social position. Broadly speaking, social position refers to the resources, power,
education, prestige, or occupation that significantly impacts one's current and future well
being. We use a simple two-player dictator experiment and measure social position by the
initial distributive shares (resources) and the subjects' ability to determine the final
distributive shares (power). Our hypothesis is that increasing a subject's power and resources
will result in an income distribution choice to that subject's greater favor. Thus, while we
contribute to the literature on Rawlsian justice, our primary focus is on the importance of
differences in unearned social position with regard to expectations, as opposed to the absence
of differences. In this way we gain insight into how the removal of such differences may
impact choices in the field. Our experiment also contributes to the understanding of behavior
in dictator

experiments.

In

ours

particular,

complements

related

experiments

on

social

distance and entitlement effects.
remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the
experimental design, subjects, and setting and compares our experiment to other laboratory
dictator and Rawlsian experiments. Section 3 provides a discussion of the results, followed by
The

concluding remarks in section 4.

2. The Experiment
In a dictator experiment (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1986), one subject determines
how a fixed sum of money is to be divided between her and one or more other players. We
and Smith 1996),
conducted a simple, double-blind (Hoffman et al. 1994; Hoffman, McCabe,
one-shot, two-person $20 dictator experiment with no show-up fee.1We implemented five
protocols in which we systematically changed language and procedures to vary the decision
maker's social position in the experiment.We obtained approximately 30 observations for each
of the five protocols, using 211 subjects.We
in each

of two

rooms

for all

treatments.

conducted sessions with approximately 15 subjects

Participants

were

students

at the U.S.

Naval

Academy

in various years of study and various majors. Students were invited to participate via E-mail
solicitation. All decisions were recorded privately by an experimenter who had no contact with
the subjects.

Protocol Giving Dictator (GD) is a standard dictator experiment. Player 1 is given $20
(an envelope with 20 one-dollar bills and 20 slips of paper) and the option of sending any
portion of this endowment to an anonymous second person with whom she has been
(PD), both players allocate $20
randomly matched. In Protocol Probabilistic Dictator
between two envelopes. One player's choice is chosen randomly and implemented with that
player retaining the Player 1 envelope. In Protocol Taking Dictator (TD), Player 2 receives
the $20 envelope and Player 1 is instructed to indicate how much of themoney she wants to
1
While

a show-up fee would have been preferred for comparing the results found in this paper to those in the literature,
U.S. Naval Academy policy did not allow us to pay students for attendance. Our experiments, therefore, closely follow
and Smith (1996), because there was no subject
the Double Blind 2 (DB2) procedure used by Hoffman, McCabe,
monitor and all dictator subjects in our experiment made real decisions. Some procedural changes were necessary to
operationalize

the desired treatments. The

instructions for all treatments are available

at http://www.usna.edu/Users/

econ/pschmitt/SCSS_Instructions.pdf.
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take. Player 2 is instructed to place this amount in a second envelope to be transferred. In
Protocol Veiled Dictator (VD), only one player (not both players, as in the PD protocol)
divides themoney between envelopes marked Player 1 and Player 2, knowing that there is
a 50% chance she will be either Player 1 or Player 2. The subjects are then randomly assigned
their role (Player 1 or Player 2). In addition to these four protocols, we asked the recipient
(Player 2) in Protocol GD "What allocation would you choose if you were Player 1?" and

"What allocation do you predict Player 1will make?"
refers to these hypothetical choices.

Protocol Hypothetical Dictator

(HD)

Of all the protocols, inGD, the decision maker is in the greatest position of resources and
power. She is given the endowment, full authority to implement the distribution of her choice,
and there is no uncertainty that her choice will be implemented. She realizes that she is
determining not only her own payoff, but also the payoff of a powerless person with whom she
is matched.

levels the playing field between matched participants. There is no difference in
neither player is initially allocated the endowment. Furthermore, both
an
equal probability of being assigned to the position of power. Therefore,
participants have
PD

resources because

the participants may perceive themselves to have identical social position relative to each
other.

is equivalent toGD in that it grants, with certainty, full power to the decision
a
maker, she is in weaker position relative toGD with regard to resources. In thisprotocol, the
decision maker is not allocated the endowment and is required to "take" money from the other
While TD

player to increase her own payoff. Inaction, in this situation, will leave the entire payoff to the
other

player.

VD most closely reproduces Rawls' veil of ignorance in the laboratory. Should the income
distribution choice be unequal, the decision maker does not know on which end of the income
distribution shewill ultimately fall. Therefore, she cannot use this information to promote her
self-interest.

HD is the hypothetical response of the powerless player, Player 2, when asked what she
would choose to do if in a position of power. Therefore, HD is the opposite ofGD in that the
decision

maker

is in the weakest

position

of resources

and

power.

on strict self-interest is that decision

A

standard game-theoretic prediction based
makers in all protocols will seek tomaximize their own monetary payoff. This implies that
decision makers in protocols GD, PD, TD, and HD (assuming an honest response) will all
choose a payoff of $20 to themselves, leaving $0 to the other player. In VD, any distribution
choice yields the same expected payoff. As implied by the Rawlsian hypothesis, risk-averse
subjects should choose equal splits, while risk-seeking subjects should choose unequal splits.
Models of pure altruism (as in Levine 1998) or inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt 1999;
Bolton and Ockenfels 2000) would predict no difference in the distribution choice in
protocols GD,
other

PD, TD,

and HD,

though the choice may

involve a positive payoff to the

player.

simple variations in our experimental instructions and procedures are intended to
generate perceived differences in unearned social position in the laboratory. The primary
objectives are (i) to testRawls' general assumption that "expectations" of distributive shares
The

are influenced by "social position" and (ii) to quantify the extent of such effects.Our simple
hypothesis is that protocols PD, TD, VD, and HD will result in lower Player 1 payoffs (that is,
more egalitarian payoffs) than the benchmark protocol GD, because decision makers are in
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a lower social position in terms of power and/or resources.2 Strictly interpretingtheRawlsian
hypothesis, all subjects should implement the equal share outcome inVD, the "veiled" protocol.
the simple dictator experiment does not allow the Rawlsian hypothesis to be
evaluated in a richer way,3 other laboratory experiments have been used to explicitly test
Rawls' predictions. In themajority of these studies, participants complete a questionnaire in
While

which theymake choices over explicit income distributions with or without veil-of-ignorance
conditions. These studies have consistently rejected the strict Rawlsian hypothesis. For
example, Fr?hlich, Oppenheimer, and Eavey (1987); Fr?hlich and Oppenheimer (1990); and

Herne and Suojanen (2004) all find that a majority of veiled individuals, given the opportunity
for group discussion, do not prefer a Rawlsian
income distribution, but rather choose
a distribution thatmaximizes the average income subject to a floor constraint. Unlike these
experiments, our experiment does not focus on the social contract chosen by groups of
individuals under veil-like conditions. Rather, we are interested in the extent to which
deviations from the veil condition impact individual choices of an income distribution in
a dictator experiment. Using a trustgame, Vyrastekova and Onderstal (2005) find that subjects
do not behave differentlywhen theyplay both roles behind a "veil" versus when theyplay the
standard

trust game.

Our experiment also contributes to the understanding of behavior in dictator experiments
in general.While the extent of giving in dictator experiments varies considerably across studies,
several consistent behavioral effectshave been demonstrated. Self-interested behavior increases
and Smith 1996)
with anonymity or social distance (Hoffman et al. 1994; Hoffman, McCabe,
and when dictators bargain over earned wealth (Hoffman et al. 1994; Ruffle 1998; Cherry 2001;
Cherry, Frykblom, and Shogren 2002). While we maintain anonymity, we demonstrate the
importance of changes in endowments (and power) that are unearned. Unlike Hoffman et al.
(1994), who used the language "provisionally allocated to each pair" to avoid perceptions of
property rights, we explicitly allocate the right to be the decision maker and an unearned
endowment

to one

party

or

the other

to reinforce

and

investigate

this effect. We

are unaware

of

other studies that explicitly examine the behavior of "giving" dictators to that of "taking"
dictators.

3. Results
1 presents the experimental results.4We compare subjects' choices (as represented
tests; we compare the
by the mean payoff to Player 1) using one-tailed Mann-Whitney
a
of
one-tailed
and
$20/$0
proportions test.
splits using
frequency
equal splits
Table

2
(1996, p. 312) briefly speculate (but do not find) for an ultimatum bargaining
Alternatively, as Harrison and McCabe
game with a similar design to our PD protocol, participants in PD may view it as acceptable to keep more than they
would in the case of GD, since the other person has an equal opportunity to do the same. Nature can be held partially
responsible for the other person's low payoff. Note that, unlike in our dictator game, the recipient in their ultimatum
game still has an opportunity to reject the proposed split, inwhich case both subjects get $0.
3
For example, one cannot evaluate the "fairness" of unequal outcomes where some gain and some lose (where the gains

are larger than the losses) or where everyone gains relative to the equal shares outcome but some individuals gain
considerably more than others.
4
An odd number of volunteers reported for the PD session. Because of the lack of a show-up fee, we allowed all
individuals in this session tomake a decision and then randomly left one individual unmatched. The decision of this
individual is included in the analysis.
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1. Results
Mean

(Player 1

Payoff)
Protocol GD:
Giving Dictator
Protocol PD:
Probabilistic
Dictator
Protocol TD:
Taking Dictator
Protocol VD:
Veiled Dictator
Protocol HDb:
Hypothetical
Dictator

Standard Deviation

(Player1Payoff)

$16.17

$4.32

24 41
29

$15.30

$4.80

29 45
31

$14.03**

$4.00

$9.80***

$5.90

$11.93***

$4.88 ($4.88)

Frequency

of Equal

($10)Splits(%)

16**
31

Frequency

of

$20/$0Splitsa(%) N

39

23*
30 43*
52*** (10)

7*** (34)

29

($15.38)

a
All $20/$0 splits that occurred were $20 for Player 1 and $0 for Player 2.
b
Number in parentheses indicates Player 2's belief about what Player 1will choose.
*
Significantly different (in the direction hypothesized) than GD Player 1 payoff or frequency of split at oc<
**
Significantly different (in the direction hypothesized) than GD Player 1 payoff or frequency of split at a <
***
Significantly different (in the direction hypothesized) than GD Player 1 payoff or frequency of split at a <

0.10.
0.05.
0.01.

results are generally consistent with the hypothesis that subjects' perceptions of
distributive justice are influenced by unearned social position. Decision makers (Player 1) in
GD were in the strongest position of power and resources. These subjects chose an income
distribution that yielded the greatestmonetary benefit (mean = $16.17) to themselves,with the
lowest rate of equal splits (24%) and the second highest number of $20/$0 splits. However,
The

compared to other similar experiments, subjects inGD made positive offersmore frequently
and Smith 1996).
(59% of the time compared to around 40% inDB2 inHoffman, McCabe,
This differencemay be partially explained by the lack of a show-up fee. If dictator subjects in
our GD treatmentmade $0 offers, the recipient truly leftthe experimentwith $0 rather than a $5
or $10 show-up fee. Subjects may factor show-up fees into their choices, which would impact
their perceptions of relative earnings.
Decisions
in PD (mean = $15.30, with 29% equal splits and 45% $20/$0 splits) were
statistically no different than inGD. We conclude that because players knew their decision
would only be relevant if theywere chosen to be the decision maker, theymade theirdecisions
as if theywere in the position of full power and resources.
However, shifting resources from Player 1 to Player 2 (giving the initial $20 to Player 2)
caused an economically and statistically significant decrease (one-tailed significance = 0.02) in
Player l's monetary demand in TD ($14.03) compared to GD ($16.17). Subjects also chose
equal splitsmore frequently (39% compared to 24%) and made statistically significantly fewer
$20/$0 splits (16% compared to 41%; one-tailed significance = 0.016). Unlike inCherry (2001)
and Cherry, Frykblom, and Shogren (2002), the difference between these treatments was
unearned. Cherry (2001) finds that only 24% of dictators made positive offers from "earned"
endowments, whereas 74% made positive offers from "unearned" endowments. When Player 2
received the "unearned" endowment inTD, 86% of dictators effectivelymade positive "offers."
Ruffle (1998) finds that dictators reward "deserving" recipients, thosewhose skill led to a larger
pie size for the pair. The modal offer in that case was half of the pie, with 21% of offers actually
being greater than half.
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Itmust be noted that given our anonymity procedures, it is possible in TD for Player 2
subjects to transfer less than the requested amount, inwhich case the recording experimenter
adjusted the contents of the envelope to match the requested amount. This provides an

interesting experimental variable and occurred in 12 of the 31 cases. However, if Player 1
subjects expected thatPlayer 2 subjects were less likely to comply with large demands, thismay
bias the demands downward. The fact that Player 2 returned $0 in four out of five cases when

$20 was demanded indicates that thismay be a real concern. In contrast, Player 2 subjects from
whom $10 was requested transferred all $10 on 10 of 12 occasions. Further experimentation

with added controls would be necessary to determine the significance of this effecton demands.
As expected, the Player 1 average payoff inVD was significantly lower than inGD ($9.80
vs. $16.17, one-tailed significance = 0.00). Subjects chose equal splits 43% of the time,which is
=
significantlymore than the 24% of equal splits that occurred inGD (one-tailed significance
0.061). However, preferences were less risk-averse than hypothesized by Rawls. The standard
deviation of Player 1payoffs was greater inVD than in all of the other protocols. Furthermore,
nearly one in four subjects chose a $20/$0 split (despite the lack of a show-up fee), a number
=
which, while significantly fewer than observed in GD
(one-tailed significance
0.069), is
some
in
the
TD
HD
were
and
greater than
protocols. Clearly,
subjects
willing to gamble on
being the one to get the higher payoff.
Finally, the decision makers inHD, who are in potentially theweakest positions of power
and resources, indicated (hypothetically) that theywould have chosen an income distribution that

was evenmore egalitarian (an average payoff to themselves of $11.93, with equal splits 52% of the
time) than any treatmentother thanVD. Only 7% of subjects indicated theywould have taken the
to theGD and TD protocols, thePlayer 1 (hypothetical) payoff decrease in
is both economically and statistically significant (one-tailed significance = 0.00 and 0.04,
respectively). Interestingly, the differencebetween what these subjects predicted theGD decision

entire $20. Compared
HD

makers would choose ($15.38) and what theGD Player 1 subjects actually chose ($16.17) is not
statistically significant,although theyunderestimated the propensity to choose equal splits (10%

predicted vs. 24% actual). Similarly, Ruffle (1998) found that, when asked what offer they
hypothetically would have made in their counterpart's position, the unskillful recipients (those

whose efforton a general knowledge test led to the smaller of two pie sizes for the pair) would
have offered substantiallymore than their counterparts actually did.
It isunclear, of course, how reliable any hypothetical response can be in this situation. One

alternative explanation for the generous responses in HD
is that some subjects prefer to
maintain a good self-impression (e.g.,Murnighan, Oesch, and Pillutla 2001) even if they cannot
maintain a good social impression as a result of anonymity conditions. That is, being generous
in a hypothetical response makes them feel good about themselves. If self-impression concerns
are significantwhen realmoney is being transferred,we would expect an even stronger impact
on hypothetical responses, because maintaining a good self-impression has no cost.
Unfortunately, we have not been able to design an experiment in which participants who
cannot influence the final distribution must make a decision other than a hypothetical one.

4. Conclusions
We
position,

used slight variations in language and procedures
as measured

by

resources

and

power,

in a

simple,

to generate differences in social
double-blind

dictator
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These variations may also have changed the social distance between subjects, a variable that has
and
been identified as an important explanatory variable for behavior (Hoffman, McCabe,
Smith 1996). While it is difficult to fully disentangle social distance from social position
experimentally, our results are consistent with Rawls' (1971) assumption regarding distributive
justice in that unearned differences in a subject's social position, as measured by power and
resources, affect expectations regarding a just income distribution.While all individuals in such
experiments must balance their self-interestwith their personal views of justice and fairness,

individuals appear to develop a sense of entitlement to a higher payoff when granted initial
property rights or the power to influence the final distribution. As other experiments have
demonstrated, making the social positions earned further strengthens the effect. This is

particularly important given that unearned differences (such as the wealth of the family into
which one is born) can subsequently lead to earned differences (such as obtaining a college
degree) that are the result (at least partially) of the individual's own efforts.
These results are in stark contrast to the predictions of standard game theory and theories
of pure altruism or inequity aversion, which predict identical outcomes in each of our
"unveiled"

even

However,

protocols.

in a "veiled"

decision-making

position,

subjects

in our

dictator experiment failed to unanimously choose an equal income distribution, as a strict
interpretationof theRawlsian hypothesis would require. Their preferences were less risk-averse
and had greater variance thanRawls hypothesized. Some subjects appeared willing to accept an
outcome

some

where

players

had more

and

some

had

relative

less,

to the egalitarian

outcome,

as long as therewas a fair chance of being the one at the desirable end of the distribution.
Perhaps there is a testable lesson here that distributive justice is not necessarily a matter of the
final wealth distribution, but rather of the probability of reaching a desirable position in the
distribution.
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